punishment -which much of the legal scholarship in this area does not do.
Disentanglement of blame from deserts suggests a via-media between criminalization and decriminalization -criminalization without incarceration. Accordingly, the legal process stops at the determination of guilt.
My argument advances the criminalization debate in a novel way because it does not get bogged down in the irreconcilable quarrel about whether corporate governance misbehavior ought to be criminalized for deterrence, retribution, or rehabilitation reasons, and whether it achieves any of these purposes. For these offenses, I argue that whichever theoretical justification underpins the decision to criminalize, imprisonment must not follow conviction. The conviction, despite the lack of incarceration, and the consequential sanctions likely to be imposed on the wrongdoer are sufficient to satisfy 13 Wendy Gerwick Couture, White Collar Crime's Gray Area: The Anomaly of Criminalizing Conduct Not Civilly Actionable, 72 Alb. L. Rev. 1, 3 (2009). ("the imposition of criminal punishment for conduct not civilly actionable risks disrupting the current scheme of securities regulation, at the expense of considerations deemed important by Congress and the courts. The lower materiality standard and the unavailability of the safe harbor in criminal cases may chill corporate disclosure and may affect what information reasonable investors rely upon when making investment decisions.") 14 As the Enron Task Force Prosecutor was quoted as saying in the Houston Chronicle: "Defendants and suspects understand that if you're selling drugs or if you rob somebody or if you take their car, that that was wrong…. But the issue we face first in Enron is, was this conduct criminal? When dealing with violent crime cases or even narcotics cases, that's never a question. That's always very, very black and white. Here we have to spend a lot of time figuring out what was done and figuring out whether that was a violation of the criminal law."). 15 Stuart P. Green, Why it's a Crime to Tear the Tag Off a Mattress: Overcriminalization and the Moral Content of Regulatory Offenses, 46 EMORY L.J. 1533, 1537 (1997) (" moral wrongfulness" …is present if the conduct made criminal is viewed by a consensus of society as immoral or in violation of a moral norm.") the three main justifications for criminalization. 16 In appropriate cases, disgorgement of the offender's gains will aid in the achievement of these objectives.
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The model proposed by this paper would yield significant savings by reducing prison costs. 18 It would also allow the state to take advantage of the disproportionate cost/burden of conviction on corporate governance offenders. Owing to the offenders' high earning potential, 19 deterrence can be achieved at lower cost by conviction alone because the cost of incarceration does not have to be borne by the state whereas the destruction of capacity to generate similar (or indeed, any) income has to be suffered by the offender even without going to jail. 20 If the cost of incarceration is the same for offenders with different earning capacities, imprisoning those with very high earning capacities is a waste of social capital if the objectives sought to be achieved by incarceration can be achieved through other means. Further, the cost of a conviction can be predicted with sufficient certainty in the case of white-collar criminals by looking at their earnings history, and in many cases this can be a significant sum. Unlike the common criminal who may not have a similarly predictable earning capacity and therefore suffer the same extent of monetary loss from a conviction, this loss ought to serve the deterrence function without the need 16 To the extent that further action is necessary, there are alternatives to imprisonment: United States v. Clark, 195 F.3d 446, 452 (9th Cir. 1999) (probation condition preventing defendant from working in law office or "any institution in the business of providing legal services"); United States v. Whitlow, 979 F.2d 1008, 1012 (5th Cir. 1992) (preventing defendant from working in used car industry); United States v. Burnett, 952 F.2d 187, 190 (8th Cir. 1991) (preventing defendant from working in business that requires travel or selling vending machines). 17 SEC v. Sands, 142 F.3d 1186; 1998 U.S. App. LEXIS 8093: "The district court has broad-equity powers to order the disgorgement of ill-gotten gains obtained through the violation of the securities laws. Disgorgement is designed to deprive a wrongdoer of unjust enrichment, and to deter others from violating securities laws by making violations unprofitable." (internal citations omitted). 18 Incarceration is extremely costly. As one expert notes, "Between 1982 and 2006, direct expenditures by federal, state, and local governments on corrections jumped from $9 billion to $68.7 billion, an increase of over 618%. During the same period, combined criminal justice expenditures (for police, judicial, and corrections activities) by federal, state, county, and municipal governments rose from $35. for the state to spend money imprisoning the offender. In addition to loss of earning capacity, clawing back ill-gotten gains significantly adds to disutility.
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The paper is set out as follows: Part II briefly outlines the scope of the wrongs tackled as stemming from the principal-agent relationship in corporate law, and the inability of the law to overcome effectively problems resulting from the collectivization of the principal in that relationship. In Part III, I argue that conviction without imprisonment is a secondbest alternative to decriminalization in cases where the conduct is blameworthy, and results in non-consensual harm. Part IV demonstrates the disutility caused by conviction alone to show that the objectives of criminalization can be satisfied without the need for imprisonment. Part V asserts that consequential sanctions like shaming add to the disutility of conviction. Part VI ties the thesis to Skilling's conviction for bad business judgment devoid of moral wrongfulness to illustrate the problems with conflating blame and punishment. Part VII concludes.
II. Scope of the Wrongs Covered
What is white-collar crime and why should it be criminalized? The oft-cited definition proposed by criminologist Sutherland -"those crimes committed by persons of respectability and high social status in the course of their occupations" -is now seen to 21 htm. Section 304 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act provides: "If an issuer is required to prepare an accounting restatement due to the material noncompliance of the issuer, as a result of misconduct, with any financial reporting requirement under the securities laws, the chief executive officer and chief financial officer of the company shall reimburse the issuer for--(1) any bonus or other incentive-based or equity-based compensation received by that person from the issuer during the 12-month period following the first public issuance or filing with the Commission (whichever first occurs) of the financial document embodying such financial reporting requirement; and (2) any profits realized from the sale of securities of the issuer during that 12-month period.
be severely problematic. 22 There is little normative justification for differentiating criminal behavior based upon the offender belonging to the privileged classes rather the hoi polloi. 23 From the standpoint of the victims of the crime, social status of the offender has, at best, marginal relevance for evaluating harm and blameworthiness. Shifting the focus away from the offender's social status to the quality of the behavior itself might be more helpful in formulating a definition. Viewed thus, white collar crime usually involves the behavior itself having the veneer of respectability and is mala prohibita 24 rather than mala in se. 25 Frequently, the conduct at issue only invites attention because it was seen to be too aggressive by regulators, when the actors themselves only believed that they were engaging in legitimately risky enterprise.
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This paper only focuses on a sub-set of white-collar offenders -corporate fiduciaries abusing the principal-agent relationship. The core arguments could be extended to other kinds of white-collar crime also because conviction without incarceration would satisfy the objectives of criminalization in many cases. The principal-agent relationship is pregnant with potential for abuse because of its inherently asymmetric nature. Agents are primarily employed in order to make up for the gaps in expertise, skill, and time that prevent principals from accomplishing the delegated tasks on their own. It is these very advantages enjoyed by agents that create problems of adverse selection and moral hazard.
To be sure, these problems are addressed by the carrot-and-stick structures created by 22 principals -by keeping a close rein on agents and circumscribing discretion, co-opting the agent into ownership of the enterprise, tying incentives to the principal's returns, and careful selection of the agent, principals try to ensure that they remain the masters of the relationship. When applied at the corporate level, the collectivization of the principal creates incentives for free-riding and rational apathy. Shareholders might have very different objectives even if they care to monitor management -ranging from the employee union shareholder's desire to protect jobs, to large institutional investors' focus on earning profits for investors. When they perceive management to be inadequate most shareholders prefer exit to taking corrective action. All these factors debilitate the monitoring power to a point where the agent is the de facto master of the relationship.
Thus, although in theory the shareholders are the principals, it is the management that exercises the greater power, primarily because of real barriers to removal caused by collective action problems, and the deference that corporate law accords to business decisions taken by management. The question that this paper addresses is whether the problems that arise by virtue of agents abusing this relationship should be the subject matter of criminal law with imprisonment as the sanction, or are better suited to civil or social sanctions. 27 Criminal sanctions have been used, for example, in the Skilling case, despite the prosecution framing the case in terms that invoke the agency cost problem.
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This resort to criminal law has been justified on the plea that the principals are not the only victims of Skilling's wrongdoing, but that his conduct engendered wider societal harm. It might also be evidence of the vicious nature of the retributive impulse following loss, even when some of it is the byproduct of consensual risk taking. 29 Shareholders, employees, and the wider public feel the urge to punish those at the top for bad bets despite the absence of moral wrongfulness and the criminal law serves an instrumental 28 See closing argument by the prosecution: "[M]ake no mistake, they got wealthy…. And in exchange for that money, they owed their employees a duty, a duty of good faith and honest services, a duty to be truthful, and a duty to do their job, ladies and gentlemen, to do their job and to do it appropriately." 29 Epithets used against Skilling included "pig," "snake," "evil," "crook," "thief," "fraud," "asshole," "criminal," "bastard," "scoundrel," "liar," "weasel," and "economic terrorist." He was described as "dirty," "deceitful," "dishonest," "greedy," "amoral," "devious," "lecherous," "manipulative," "unscrupulous," "despicable," "equivalent [to] an axe murderer" who has "no conscience," "stole from employees," and "swindled a lot of people." He was condemned as "guilty as sin," for which "he needs to pay the price," go to "jail for 20 years," and "be hanged Paul H. Robinson, Moral Credibility and Crime, Atl. Monthly, Mar. 1995, at 72, 77 "As the label "criminal" is increasingly applied to minor violations of a merely civil nature, criminal liability will increasingly become indistinct from civil and will lose its particular stigma. In short, these critics contend, applying criminal sanctions to morally neutral conduct is both unjust and counterproductive. It unfairly brands defendants as criminals, weakens the moral authority of the sanction, and ultimately renders the penalty ineffective. It also squanders scarce enforcement resources and invites selective, and potentially Professor Green wrote in a recent work, " [w] labeling," because it fails to ensure "that widely felt distinctions between kinds of offenses and degrees of wrongdoing are respected and signaled by the law, and that offenses should be divided and labeled so as to represent fairly the nature and magnitude of the law-breaking." 36 However, Green argues that white collar crimes correspond well to moral norms of a common-sense sort. 37 He writes that "certain fine-grained distinctions in our criminal law are a reflection of equally fine-grained distinctions in our moral thinking, and vice-versa. 38 Thus, white-collar crime doctrine that may at first glance seem puzzling and internally inconsistent can often be explained through reflection on the moral concepts that underlie it. And, by the same token, ostensibly baffling distinctions we make in our everyday moral lives can in some cases be traced to distinctions that first appeared, or are most clearly articulated, in the criminal law."
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Green, thus distinguishes lying from deception by arguing that, "merely misleading is less wrongful than lying because what I call the principle of caveat auditor, or "listener discriminatory, prosecution. We should reserve the criminal law--the "heavy artillery" of our legal system …for conduct that reflects the traditional conception of criminality." 34 Stuart Green, LYING, CHEATING, STEALING, 1 (OUP) 2007. ("a widely felt sense -expressed by judges, jurors, scholars, journalists, and the average citizen -that the law in this area involves a kind of moral uncertainty that distinguishes it from that which governs more familiar 'core' cases of crime.) Id. at 1. 35 Id. at 46. 36 Id at 42. 37 These moral norms, according to him, "are fairly concrete. Although there will be significant disagreement over the precise content and application of such norms, almost every civilized person will have some rudimentary understanding that it is morally wrong, at least in certain core cases, to lie, cheat, steal, … Even people who have never had occasion to read a single page of moral philosophy are capable of making remarkably fine-grained distinctions about, say, what properly constitutes cheating or stealing." Id. at 45. 38 "The divergent ways in which the offenses of perjury and fraud treat the requirement of deception …reflect deep-seated and fine-grained distinctions concerning the concept of deception that we make in our everyday moral lives." Id. at 42. 39 Green, at 5.
beware," applies to cases of merely misleading but does not apply to lying. Like the principle of caveat emptor, which says that a buyer is responsible for assessing the quality of a purchase before buying, the principle of caveat auditor says that, in certain circumstances, a listener is responsible, or partly responsible for ascertaining that a statement is true before believing it." 40 Green's thesis posits that people are able to make moral distinctions between these offenses. He does not elucidate on how this transpires.
Green seems to conflate common morality with critical morality in coming to this conclusion. As the Skilling case demonstrates in the following pages, it is unduly optimistic to suppose that public perceptions of moral wrongfulness are nuanced enough to separate conduct that is merely risky from that which is criminal, and the dangers are exacerbated in the context of corporate criminal conduct due to the infiltration of negative emotions like envy and resentment. The popular perception that CEOs and senior corporate executives are greedy and arrogant is probably at the root of the visceral reactions to news reports about alleged acts of wrongdoing. Given this fact, it is hard to see that common morality will be able to set aside these negative emotions when evaluating conduct for criminal sanctions.
There is danger also from the imprecise and ambiguous nature -in terms of moral rightness or wrongness -of the conduct at issue in agency crimes. another with whom one is in a cooperative, rule-bound relationship," then the violation constitutes the moral wrong of cheating. 45 Giving the example of insider trading, he writes that it is wrongful because it is essentially cheating, because the trader "(1)
violates the SEC rule that one must either disclose material non-public information or abstain from trading; and does so (2) with the intent to obtain an advantage over a second party with whom she is in a cooperative, rule-governed relationship." 46 The basis of the abstain-or-disclose rule appears to be that investors must have confidence that the game is being played fairly, and that it is unfair that some traders who have privileged access to information should be allowed to make money off of the information. This is not as clear as Green would like to believe because there is a clear body of scholarship contending that insider trading is actually beneficial to the market because it facilitates more efficient pricing of securities. 47 Further, it is unlikely that the person who is purchasing the securities from the insider is being taken advantage of in every situation. It is quite likely that the buyer sold the securities also before the information surfaced and caused the stock price to fall. In this case, the buyer is also profiting, rather than being taken advantage of as Green contends. If it is assumed that the argument is that the entire market is being taken advantage of, even that does not suffice as a strong case for criminalization because in many cases the insider's transactions might be small in relation to the market for securities of the relevant company, with the result that the consequences are de minimis. Further, the chief complaint of the non-insiders is that they also did not have the opportunity to cash in on the non-public information, not that they were cheated. If they had been able to cash in, there would have been no complaint. This, again, illustrates the moral ambiguity of the alleged crime. 45 Green, supra note __ at 250. However, he qualifies this by writing that "harmfulness without wrongfulness is not supposed to be enough to satisfy the retributive demands of the criminal law. In the absence of a persuasive argument that lawbreaking per se entails some independent form of moral wrongfulness" he doubts that "criminalization can be justified." Id. at 254. 46 Id. at 240. reason for adopting a hard line against offenders. 54 Given the harm caused by white collar criminals, some believe that the privileged treatment accorded to them erodes the deterrent power of the criminal law because it signals that society treats criminals from rich backgrounds differently than those from poorer ones. Some prosecutors complain that judges are more sympathetic to pleas by corporate defendants to reduce or avoid incarceration, and that this affects their decisions to bring to trial offences that are more complicated and resource intensive than other crimes. 55 Observers also claim that this is particularly lamentable because the deterrent objectives of the criminal law are particularly well suited to effective application against corporate defendants because they are usually educated, and commit their crimes after rational thought. 56 All of these have coalesced to create a growing public opinion that corporate wrongdoers must be equated with ordinary criminals and that incarceration is necessary.
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These justifications constitute the harm prevention model of criminalization -it is permissible to criminalize harmful white-collar conduct even if it is not morally wrongful. It is not necessary that the act should have also offended a moral wrong -it suffices that the offender violated a legal ban. Joel Feinberg's harm principle, for example, posits that: "[i]t is legitimate for the state to prohibit conduct that causes serious private harm, or the unreasonable risk of such harm, or harm to important public institutions and practices. In short, state interference with a citizen's behavior tends to be 54 One expert stated that the economic value of securities fraud alone is at about $40 billion, compared with $10 billion for street crime. See, Testimony of Glenn B. Gainer III, US Senate Hearings, supra note 1. 55 Statement of Hon. James B. Comey, Jr., United States Attorney, Southern District of New York, New York, US Senate Hearings ("they work to eliminate or reduce that jail time because of the defendant's civic work or charitable work or his great employment record or his big family or his health problems, or a whole host of factors that the Guidelines say are discouraged…") 56 Id. ([white collar criminals are]…more sophisticated than most criminals. They commit their crimes not in a fit of passion or out of addiction or a craving, but with cold and careful calculation. They are, in my experience, the most rational of offenders and are more likely to weigh the risks against the anticipated rewards of committing a crime.)"; See also, Statement of Hon. Jeff Sessions, U.S. Senator from Alabama, US Senate Hearings, supra note 1. ("I was a United States Attorney during the Savings and Loan fraud cases. I prosecuted Federal land bank fraud cases. My office prosecuted those cases that I supervised, and I am going to tell you there is a lot better behavior in banking today because people went to jail over those cases in the past. They lost everything they had, their families were embarrassed, and a lot of people started checking to make sure they were doing their banking correctly.") 57 Statement of Glen B. Gainer, III, West Virginia State Auditor, and Chairman, National White Collar Crime Center, West Virginia, US Senate Hearings ("Our research section has found through our last nationwide study that most Americans view economic crime, or what we would consider white collar crime, to be every bit as important and deserve equal time and prosecution as traditional street crime…") morally justified when it is reasonably necessary to prevent harm or the unreasonable risk of harm to parties other than the person interfered with." 58 It is important to understand what constitutes harm. As is typically used in the criminal law, "criminal harm" can involve bodily harm, 59 and social harm involving collective losses. 60 The first kind is unproblematic and no one seriously disputes the validity of the state criminalizing such conduct. The second might also be acceptable in cases where the harm is non-consensual and involves third parties suffering without the ability to avoid the harm. However, no such necessity exists in situations involving agency problems as the principals have tools at their disposal to control the wrongdoers. There are perfectly adequate civil and social sanctions that can achieve the objectives -incapacitation, retribution, and deterrence -at much lower cost. Principals can act in concert, use regulators like the SEC, or through intermediaries like stock exchanges, and institutional shareholders to do all this without the need for the state to incur imprisonment expenses.
Corporate crimes certainly involve harm -sometimes on a massive scale such as that caused by the bankruptcy of Enron. However, this harm is the price of capitalism and there are other mechanisms that can tackle it more efficiently. I contend that for conduct without the taint of moral wrongfulness, but where non-consensual harm results, criminalization without incarceration is a second-best alternative to decriminalization.
Removing incarceration from the table also separates blameworthiness from punishment.
To be sure, the state possesses advantages in determining blame, but its advantages in terms of punishing corporate governance offenders are less clear. If the high cost of incarcerating non-violent offenders outweighs the cost of other kinds of punishment, without corresponding benefits, scaling back the state monopoly on punishment to areas where it enjoys advantages might be advisable. Decoupling blame from punishment also recognizes the reality that conviction alone is sufficient punishment. punishment is necessary, state-punishment could be restricted to fines and impediments to holding positions involving trust.
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IV. Conviction as a sufficient sanction: theoretical underpinnings
Deterrence
This section undertakes an exploration of the theoretical justifications for the deterrence value of conviction for corporate governance wrongs by comparing and contrasting it with the deterrent value of imprisonment. The most frequently advanced justification for criminalization is deterrence --offenders will be deterred from committing criminal acts if the benefits from committing those acts do not exceed the probability of being caught multiplied by the cost of punishment following prosecution. 62 Thus, a rational actor will trade off the expected value of committing the criminal act against two variables --the probability of being caught, and the punishment after conviction. If the probability of being caught is rather low, the criminal act might confer value even if the punishment is high. The same principle applies if the punishment is low and the probability of being caught is high. These two variables are a function of the resources that the state possesses and determinations as to their optimal allocation. This vein of scholarship draws on work by Gary Becker, whose economics based approach, showed that stringent fines were preferable to imprisonment. 63 Subsequent work building on this has important implications for this paper's thesis. In an important article calculating the disutility of imprisonment, Polinsky and Shavell posit that there are three kinds of offenders --riskneutral (offenders for whom the severity and probability of imprisonment has equal deterrent value), risk-averse (offenders for whom severity of imprisonment has greater deterrent value than probability of imprisonment), and risk-preferring (those for whom the severity of imprisonment has less deterrent value than the probability of To start our analysis, the probability of conviction is p, the length of imprisonment is l, and the total disutility is u. Total disutility is made up of disutility of conviction c and disutility of imprisonment i. Although other factors like age and social situation can be significant variables in calculating total disutility, for simplicity we exclude those factors in some proportion to sentence length to a point where the utility of a life sentence might move into positive territory. 65 To explain, if an individual is sentenced to undergo 64 Mitchell Polinsky and Steven Shavell, On the Disutility and Discounting of Imprisonment and the Theory of Deterrence, 28 J. Legal Stud. 1 (1999) (if the disutility from imprisonment rises in proportion to sentence length, then an increase in the magnitude of sanctions has the same effect as an equal percentage increase in the probability of sanctions. However, if disutility rises more than in proportion to the sentence, raising the magnitude of sanctions has a greater effect than increasing their probability by the same percentage amount. Conversely, if disutility rises less than in proportion to the sentence, raising the magnitude of sanctions has a smaller effect than increasing their probability.) 65 Professors Robinson and Darley and quote Kahneman to make a similar point: "The well being of prison inmates is likely to improve in the course of their sentence, as they gain seniority and survival skills... Suppose ... that prisoners apply a Peak and End rule in retrospective evaluations of their prison experience. The result would be a global evaluation that becomes steadily less aversive with time in prison, implying a negative correlation between sentence length and the deterrence of individual recidivism. This is surely not imprisonment for 20 years at the age of 55, even if the disutility of the first year is very high, this declines as the person proceeds further into his sentence and ages because the alternative of being released at an old age, without any prospect of income or caregivers, might be more unpalatable than staying in jail. Similarly, if the sentence is life imprisonment, each year after the first might become more bearable and it might be preferable to die in jail.
Now let us consider the case of reputation-indifferent individuals with a no disutility for conviction alone. Probability of conviction is 10 percent, disutility of conviction is 0, disutility of any sentence length is 5 and the sentence is 10 years. Now total disutility is Similarly, tweaking the probability of conviction has the following consequences.
Assume that the probability of conviction is 0.025, disutility of conviction is 200, disutility of any sentence length is 0 and sentence length is 10 years. Total disutility is .025 [(0x10) + 200] = 5. This means that this offender can be deterred to the same extent as the reputation-indifferent individual who is imprisoned for 10 years with a disutility of 5, at one-fourth the cost of enforcement without even incurring the cost of imprisonment,
i.e., by conviction alone. Thus, spending the same amount of money on enforcement for both types of offenders is a waste of money. periods rather than lifetime bars, unless there are strong reasons to impose the latter.
Given the inherent limitations of any system of predicting future behavior, even taking account of prior misconduct will ensure that some CEOs will be falsely predicted to have the potential for re-offending and will receive unnecessarily long bar orders. These individuals will experience undeserved hardship and there will be a net loss of social
welfare. Yet others will be falsely predicted to be low risk of re-offending and will receive short term bars. Such individuals might re-offend and create new victims. Since this category is more likely to be the focus of attention, it might explain the view that white-collar offenders also have a significant rate of recidivism.
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To conclude, the principal objective of criminalization is to prevent corporate governance offenders from committing similar offences and to deter others; the first can be achieved by disqualifying them from holding responsible office, the second can be achieved by conviction without imprisonment aided by consequential sanctions. 78 A third objective is to ensure that they do not retain the fruits of their misconduct. This can be achieved by an order to disgorge and by clawing back ill-gotten gains. Incarceration does not aid any of these purposes. To the extent that retribution is an objective, and is not satisfied by the above sanctions, consequential sanctions that inevitably follow conviction ought to suffice in any civilized society. This has the added advantage of decentralizing the retributive objective and allowing non-state actors to impose punishment.
V. Consequential Sanctions
Conviction inevitably results in consequential sanctions ranging from shaming to legal impediments and denial of privileges. As has been previously argued, this is a significant burden for corporate governance offenders and contributes to their high disutility of conviction alone. If, as can be accepted, one of the objectives of criminalization is to socialize offenders and society at large, the shaming element that inevitably accompanies who are willing to punish are also willing to keep on cooperating. This guaranties that, as long as these individuals have the opportunity to punish, cooperation can be sustained. Furthermore these kinds of individuals might help cooperation emerge, even if it was initially rare. In addition, the same type of people is necessary to support punishment in the presence of retaliation. If retaliation deters individuals from using the punishment mechanism, cooperation can unravel."). 83 Senator ByrdThe President apparently is so miffed with these corporatewrongdoers that he has elevated them in his rhetoric to a bad-guy level that is almost, but not quite as bad, as al-Qaedas evildoers. Almost the same level; perhaps not quite. Senate Hearings on PCAOB legislation, See 148 CONG. REC. S6603, S6606 (daily ed. July 11, 2002). 84 SEC v. Sands, 142 F.3d 1186; 1998 U.S. App. LEXIS 8093: "Sands, a sophisticated businessman and a lawyer, has engaged in numerous activities in violation of the securities laws and basic notions of right and wrong. We need not sort out whether his principles are just plain wrong, or whether he is afflicted with akrasia."
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See call by AFL-CIO for Kenneth Langone, a director of the NYSE board who defended Richard Grasso's compensation package, to be dropped from the board of GE and four other public companies. Troy Wolverton, AFL-CIO's Throw-the-Bum-Out Call Gets Cool Reception, STREET.COM (Sept. 26, 2003), available at http://www.thestreet.com/stocks/troywolverton/10116076.html. 86 In SEC v. Sands, 142 F.3d 1186; 1998 U.S. App. LEXIS 8093, the defendant argued that the bar against him holding office as director was against the public interest because it would prevent him from serving on offender and observers. As discussed previously, individuals with high capacity for shame are reputation-conscious and incarceration is a waste of resources for such actors. 87 Norm-internalization for white-collar offenders is enabled by the significant detriment in terms of loss of employment opportunities and social exclusion experienced (in other words, disutility of conviction relevant authority. 91 Such legal impediments to the offender holding offices involving trust can be finely calibrated to achieve incapacitation in much the same way that jail does. 92 Even if impediments are not imposed it is unlikely that the individual will be able to find similar employment following conviction. Prestige goods are also likely to be denied in non-professional contexts because these offenders are also members of social groups which view conviction with distaste. 93 Membership conditions and interactions after admittance present ideal conditions for deploying shaming as esteem is vital for profitable interactions. 94 Even if some offenders are not affected by shaming, other observers might see the disutility of the alleged offense and modify their behavior.
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Membership in these groups is intrinsically related to the possession of a good reputation, and the gate-keeping function served by these groups might obviate the need for incarceration by delivering the same behavioral change.
96 91 SEC v. Sands: "The district court has broad equitable powers to fashion appropriate relief for violations of the federal securities laws, which include the power to order an officer and director bar. In addition to the court's inherent equitable powers, the Securities Enforcement Remedies and Penny Stock Reform Act of 199(Remedies Act) authorizes the court to order an officer and director bar if the person's conduct demonstrates substantial unfitness to serve as an officer or director. In determining whether to order the bar, a court may consider(1) the 'egregiousness' of the underlying securities law violation; (2) the defendant's 'repeat offender' status; (3) the defendant's 'role' or position when he engaged in the fraud; (4) the defendant's degree of scienter; (5) the defendant's economic stake in the violation; and (6) the likelihood that misconduct will recur." (internal citations omitted) 92 SEC v. Patel, 61 F.3d 137; 1995 U.S. App. LEXIS 19696: "Although it is not essential for a lifetime ban that there be past violations, we think that it is essential, in the absence of such violations, that a district court articulate the factual basis for a finding of the likelihood of recurrence. We take note of the fact that the governing statute provides that a bar on service as an officer or director that is based on substantial unfitness may be imposed conditionally or unconditionally and permanently or for such period of time as [the court] -shall determine. Before imposing a permanent bar, the court should consider whether a conditional bar (e.g., a bar limited to a particular industry) and/or a bar limited in time (e.g., a bar of five years) might be sufficient, especially where there is no prior history of unfitness. We do not think that it would be improper for the district court to take into account any prior punishment that may have been imposed in a criminal proceeding. If the district court decides that a conditional ban or a ban limited in time is not warranted, it should give reasons why a lifetime injunction is imposed." 93 Cite. 2007): "The law does not exist merely to allocate benefits and burdens; it also says things through its actions.. . . . It is not as if society punishes by inflicting suffering and then stating in words that it does not approve of the offender's conduct. Rather, the punishment is the expression of condemnation: Society gives out harsh punishments for serious crimes because it wants to condemn those crimes in no uncertain terms. This is to say that, conventionally, hard treatment is society's way of expressing disapproval of criminal acts. Words alone are not good enough; the walls of a prison are. believe that their conduct was wrongful, they are likely to be angered by the imposition of a shame sanction rather than feel remorse. Even if they change their actions following the shaming because they realize the disutility created, this is unlikely to be sustainable.
Resentment and anger are likely to motivate them to find new ways to break the rules.
This could be partially addressed by incapacitating them from holding similar positions of trust through the use of legal impediments.
I have also discussed, in previous work, 106 the various objections to shaming, and do not regurgitate those arguments here except to address one objection -the lack of process protections. 107 This line of scholarship contends that the lack of process might lead to shame sanctions being imposed on the innocent. Further, there is no architecture to make the amount of shame proportional to the wrong committed by the offender resulting in regulatory agency, professional association or a stock exchange, much of the due process problem can be negated.
VI. Skilling's Case
At It is also important to note that unlike the other bete noire, Andrew Fastow, Skilling was not accused of stealing from Enron. Further, the trial showed that Fastow by his own admission had concealed his thefts from Skilling. Given the nature of Skilling's personality and marriage to Enron's success, there was no case that Skilling had sabotaged the company's interests to benefit his own. The Enron Task Force, which had been set up to investigate and bring to justice those who were responsible for Enron's collapse did not deny that Skilling "loved the company," "was very committed" and "dedicated" to it, and "had the best interests of Enron in mind."
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Despite these facts, the indictment alleged that, starting in late 1999, Skilling spearheaded a massive conspiracy to deceive investors about Enron's financial health, by manipulating the company's financial results and lying about the performance of its businesses. 121 The indictment alleged that this conspiracy included almost 125 people from Enron's senior management to entry level employees to professionals at several establishments in the legal, banking, and finance sectors. 122 The Task Force contended that the conspiracy's objective had been to pump up Enron's stock price artificially-by regularly reporting financial information that met or exceeded Wall Street analysts'
expectations, trumpeting Enron's successes, and concealing its failures.
123
The indictment alleged that Skilling and his co-conspirators engaged in five areas of fraud: 1. LJM: which involved a special purpose entity, whose general partner was Enron CFO Andrew Fastow, where they manufactured earnings and hid losses through fraudulent transactions; 124 2. Reserves: where they manipulated reserve accounts allegedly by raiding reserves in one quarter, and taking extra reserves in another, to report earnings that exceeded or met with analysts' expectations; 125 3.Wholesale: where they misrepresented the nature of the business as a "logistics company" that yielded stable, sustainable earnings, when it was really a risky "trading company" whose profits depended on speculative bets on energy prices. The government alleged that spindoctoring Wholesale as a "logistics company" made a difference to how the market valued it. Allegedly, Skilling was alive to this fact and did tell Ken Rice, EBS's CEO, 120 Cite. 121 Fastow testified: "at Enron the culture was and the business practice seemed to consistently be to do transactions that maximized the financial reporting earnings as opposed to…maximizing the true economic value of the transaction. Fastow testified that Skilling told him: "I'll make sure you're all right on the project," and "You won't lose any money." Fastow opined that Enron's failure to disclose these supposed "guarantees" made its financial statements false. that the stock would "get whacked" if the fact that it was a risky trading company was apparent to the market. 126 The government also alleged that Skilling shifted losses from other divisions to Wholesale in order to convey the appearance that they were financially sound, when they were not, so as to attract further investment 127 ; 4. Retail/EES (Enron Energy Services): where they concealed the failure of the Retail business by using a "resegmentation" to shift Retail's losses into Wholesale, then stating EES was "firmly on track." 128 EES was created by Enron to sell natural gas to customers in deregulated markets. It belied its initial expectations of being profitable and was struggling financially. The problems were compounded by the distress faced by Californian utility companies which owed EES substantial amounts, and which had already been booked as profits under the mark-to-market accounting rules. where they allegedly concealed the failure of the Broadband business by falsely stating it was "healthy" and "growing fast". 134 As is evident at first blush, the statements at issue 125 The Task Force argued that reserves were manipulated to hit earnings targets in three separate quarters: 4Q 1999; 2Q 2000; and 4Q 2000. 126 Appeal Judgment at __. 127 Id. 128 Id. 129 Id. 130 Id. 131 Id. 132 Id. 133 The Task Force alleged Skilling concealed the failure of Enron's relatively new Retail unit, Enron Energy Services, by moving hundreds of millions in alleged losses from Retail to Wholesale. The Task Force also claimed Skilling misled analysts by failing to tell them that the real purpose of the reorganization was to hide losses, instead telling them it was done for efficiency-"to get the best hands working risk management." Skilling was also told the accounting and disclosures were appropriate. 134 The Task Force said Skilling misrepresented the outlook of EBS's business and the sources of its revenues.
were remarkably like puffery, rather than criminal fraud. 135 In some cases they were bad business decisions based on hindsight, but were they worthy of imprisonment?
136
The government also alleged that Skilling made misrepresentations to investors during several conference calls. 137 The relevant ones are:
January 22, 2001 -Skilling told investors: "the situation in California had little impact on fourth quarter results. Let me repeat that. For Enron, the situation in California had little impact on fourth quarter results." 138 Further, "nothing can happen in California that would jeopardize" earnings targets. 139 The government claimed that at the time of these statements, Skilling knew that the California utilities were not in a position to pay Enron and that a loss of hundreds of millions of dollars would have to be booked. 140 Allegedly, at this call, Skilling was a mute bystander when Mark Koenig, Enron's Director of Investor Relations, stated that non-core business revenues were a "fairly small" amount of EBS's earnings. 141 The government contends that this was false. , following news on the market that EBS was in dire straits, and Enron's 135 "In our Bandwidth Intermediation Business, we are making excellent progress in creating a commodity market for bandwidth." 136 Skilling's testimony is revealing: "I'll make the last one argument for Broadband because people criticize me about Broadband, and I will take the criticism. We --certainly, we made a mistake. But it wasn't big. I mean, it was a billion dollars. We invested a billion dollars in the Broadband business. falling stock price, Skilling convened a special conference call with analysts. He claimed that EBS was "having a great quarter" and that Enron was "highly confident" that EES would meet its earning target. 145 The government alleges that Skilling knew this was not true.
146
April 17, 2001, Skilling told another conference call that the transfer of EES's riskmanagement books to Wholesale was because there was "such capacity in our wholesale business that we're-we just weren't taking advantage of that in managing our portfolio at the retail side. And this retail portfolio has gotten so big so fast that we needed to get the best-the best hands working on risk management there." 147 The government alleges that the motivation was to conceal losses. During the call, Skilling also said that the "first quarter results were great" at EES, despite them being down, and with regard to EBS,
claimed that there was a very strong development of the marketplace in the commoditization of bandwidth …we're feeling very good about the development of this business."
148
July 17, 2001: Skilling stated that EES "had an outstanding second quarter" and was "firmly on track to achieve" earnings targets, despite EES posting a loss of hundreds of millions of dollars. 149 He again claimed that EES's reorganization was undertaken for efficiency reasons (not to hide losses as alleged by the government).
150
Skilling also allegedly raided the reserve accounts flush from Wholesale's profitable second half of 2000 -which had allowed it to put over $850 million in reserves. 151 The government contends that the decision to put the funds into reserves was not based on feared potential liabilities, but rather to use it instrumentally to manipulate earnings.
152
Skilling allegedly used it to hit a specific earnings target to meet Wall Street Id. expectations. 153 The government also argued that Skilling was aware of Enron's SEC filings containing false statements, including the wrong recognition of money from the Nigerian barges deal as legitimate income despite the fact that it was not really a sale.
154
In addition, it was alleged that Enron misled Arthur Andersen by giving them management-representation letters knowing them to be false, thus undermining the auditing process. 155 In particular, these representations claimed that all related party transactions were disclosed when they were not.
156
In terms of the mental element required for conviction, the conspiracy count required that
Skilling "knew the unlawful purpose of the agreement." 157 The securities fraud counts required that he "knowingly" engaged in a "fraud or deceit." 158 The false statements to auditors counts required that Skilling "knowingly" made materially false statements or omitted material facts. 159 Finally, the insider trading counts required that he "knowingly employed a device, scheme, or artifice to defraud" by trading on inside information.
160
None of these were directly proved through documentary evidence.
Instead, the prosecution based its case on self-serving testimony provided by witnesses who had everything to gain by pinning blame on Skilling for what were, at worst, bad business judgments. 161 During the trial, Skilling's defense was that he did not break any laws, and that his actions were undertaken as a loyal employee of Enron. 162 He also claimed that he had always relied on competent legal and accounting advice. 163 months' imprisonment, three years' supervised release, and $45 million in restitution.
As is apparent, the sheer size of a company like Enron necessitates the creation of large sub-structures comprising of several layers of subordinates, governance systems, and internal and outside advisors to ensure the proper structuring and vetting of business transactions and decisions. It is upon these substructures that CEOs and senior executives turn to for most of the decisions that they are required to make. They act upon the basis of the advice provided by these processes, and the success of any company is owed in substantial measure to the efficacy of these decision-making systems. It is indeed rare for CEOs to run companies the size of Enron as personal fiefdoms where every decision is made on their own accord and without consultation with and reliance on advisors, internal and external. It is also not typical that CEOs, actively seek out personal accounting or legal advice in addition to those offered by these substructures. It makes sense then for them to rely on expert advice, and for such reliance to be useful in showing that they did not possess the required knowledge or intent to engage in criminal conduct. 167 Cite. 168 The Raptors were four structured finance transactions used to hedge-or offset the risk in-various Enron investments. Each Raptor was capitalized by $400 million in Enron stock and a $30 million investment by LJM. Fastow testified there was a "secret oral side deal": LJM was to receive its $30 million investment back, plus $11 million in profits, before any hedging could begin. Skilling testified that the Raptors were a self-insurance structure that protected the value of the assets hedged by Enron: if Enron's stock in the Raptors went up, the hedging vehicles (or self-insurance policy) would be capitalized with gains on Enron's stock; if Enron's stock went down, Enron's stock contribution to the vehicles would be protected through the proceeds from the put. 169 Skilling Brief at _. 175 In another case, the court concluded that to "constru [e] knowingly in a criminal statute to include willful blindness to the existence of a fact is no radical concept in the law." 176 Key to the doctrine is that the conduct of the defendant "denotes a conscious effort to avoid positive knowledge of a fact which is an element of 174 The doctrine allows a defendant to be found to have acted knowingly if he knew with high probability that a certain fact existed and acted deliberately to avoid obtaining information that would confirm the fact. The instruction provided to the jury during the trial was: "The word "knowingly," as that term is used throughout these instructions, means that the act was done voluntarily and intentionally, not because of mistake or accident. an offense charged … choosing to remain ignorant so he can plead lack of positive knowledge in the event he should be caught." 177 In order to apply the doctrine, the conduct must be "Don't tell me, I don't want to know."
have repeatedly emphasized that it should only be given "in the "rare" instance where there is significant evidence of deliberate ignorance." 179 The concern has been that " [b] ecause the instruction permits a jury to convict a defendant without a finding that the defendant was actually aware of the existence of illegal conduct, the deliberate ignorance instruction poses the risk that a jury might convict the defendant on a lesser negligence Is deliberate ignorance even possible in a corporation the size of Enron with its army of lawyers, accountants and consultants? Expert advice is routinely provided and there is no evidence that Skilling deliberately sought to avoid getting advice when he should have.
There are few facts which justify the conclusion that there was a pattern of suspicious transactions that ought to have caused Skilling to act. Skilling's case had never been that he did not know the facts. His case was that his actions were not illegal. As the 5th circuit put it, "[h]e claims that he "agreed" at trial with the government's characterization of him as knowing everything that went on at Enron. He maintains that his "defense was not that he was unaware of fraud, but that there was no fraud."
185 This strikes at the root of the deliberate ignorance ground because if he had full knowledge of the actions but did not believe them to be illegal, there is no case. There is obviously no need to contrive to avoid finding out about legal facts. Having come this far, the 5th circuit gets it horribly wrong: "Even if Skilling is correct that there is little evidence to support a deliberate ignorance instruction, however, any error in the district court's decision to give the instruction was harmless. This is because the peril to be avoided in cases reversing convictions based on the deliberate ignorance instruction is not present here. By his own admission, Skilling claims that he knew of the allegedly illegal acts, so there is no risk that a jury would rely on the deliberate ignorance instruction to find that he should have known of the acts. Consequently, even if the district court erred in giving the deliberate ignorance instruction in the sense that the instruction was "not supported by evidence,"
any such error was necessarily harmless." 186 This is a terrible travesty. The court completely confuses Skilling's case -he did not contend that he knew the acts were illegal. 187 Rather, the claim was that he knew of the acts, which were all legal! 188 Skilling appealed, contending inter alia, that the government used an invalid theory of "honest-services fraud" to convict him. The jury had convicted Skilling of one count of conspiracy. The problem was that it did not specify which object of the conspiracy had been used to convict and given that one of them was honest services, Skilling sought to overturn the conviction alleging that this was an invalid theory. In US v. Brown, 191 the government's "honest services" theory was rejected by the court in similar circumstances. In Brown, Enron and Merrill Lynch employees were alleged to have engaged in a conspiracy to defraud Enron and its shareholders by "parking" the now infamous "Nigerian barges" with Merrill Lynch for six months to artificially boost Enron's earnings. 192 It was alleged that Merrill paid $7 million to acquire equity in the barges to help Enron post $12 million in earnings to meet its forecasts. 193 The state's case was that this was a sham transaction because Enron executives orally promised Merrill a flat fee of $250,000 and a guaranteed 15% annual rate of return for the six months that it was required to hold the asset. 194 Further, the government alleged that the transaction was in the nature of a lease rather than a sale because Enron executives promised it would buyback Merrill's interest if no third party could be found. 195 The court was unsympathetic to the government's claims because the facts did not show that the defendants had acted at the expense of the company, or had engaged in bribery and selfdealing. 196 Rather, their actions were to the benefit of Enron. According to the majority, "[w]e do not presume that it is in a corporation's legitimate interests ever to misstate earnings -it is not. However, where an employer intentionally aligns the interests of the employee with a specified corporate goal, where the employee perceives its pursuit of that goal as mutually benefiting him and his employer, and where the employee's conduct is consistent with that perception of the mutual interest, such conduct is beyond the reach of the honest-services theory of fraud as it has hitherto been applied."
197
The test for a deprivation of "honest services" case, which is laid down in Rybicki, 198 is that the defendant is secretly acting for his own interest while purporting to act for the employer. This is consistent with the Seventh Circuit's ruling in United States v.
Bloom.
199
There is no evidence that Skilling engaged in bribery or self dealing. Nor did he act secretly for his own benefit at the expense of Enron. There was no deprivation of "honest services" because, if anything, Skilling's interests were too closely aligned with Enron's. Brown contending that he "violated his fiduciary obligations and his duty to provide Enron and its shareholders with honest services by setting an improper corporate goalimproperly maintaining and increasing Enron's share price and maintaining its credit rating -and then scheming to achieve that goal by committing, directing, and causing others to commit a series of fraudulent actions that Skilling could not have perceived as being consistent with any legitimate corporate interest." 200 They also allege that in Brown the offenders were "low-level" employees who were acting on orders from superiors whereas Skilling was not acting in pursuance of goals imposed on him by those above him.
201
The 5th circuit analyzed Brown as creating the following ingredients for establishing projections. Second, Enron aligned its interests with Skilling's personal interests, e.g., through his compensation structure, leading Skilling to undertake fraudulent means to achieve the goal. Third-and fatally to Skilling's argument-no one at Enron sanctioned Skilling's improper conduct. That is, Skilling does not allege that the Board of Directors or any other decisionmaker specifically directed the improper means that he undertook to achieve his goals. Of course, a senior executive cannot wear his "executive" hat to sanction a fraudulent scheme and then wear his "employee" hat to perpetuate that fraud.
Therefore, it is not a matter of Skilling setting the corporation's policy himself. Instead, the question is whether anyone who supervised Skilling specifically directed his actions-such as how Fastow sanctioned the scheme in Brown. Skilling never alleged that he engaged in his conduct at the explicit direction of anyone, and therefore he cannot avail himself of the exception from Brown." 206 204 96 F.3d at 775. 205 Appeal Judgment at __. 206 Appeal judgment at __. The court also said: "The elements of honest-services wire fraud applicable here are (1) a material breach of a fiduciary duty imposed under state law, 14 including duties defined by the employer-employee relationship, 15 (2) that results in a detriment to the employer. Brown sheds light on the employer-employee relationship by creating an exception for when the employer specifically directs the There is one problem: where is the "fraudulent" action undertaken by Skilling to achieve the corporate goal of achieving earnings? There is too facile an assumption of fraud and impropriety without the evidence to back it up. The application of the honest services theory in cases where bad business decisions caused financial losses dangerously corrodes the very basis of criminal liability by conflating moral wrongfulness with risk taking. It must be clarified if it has to serve the intended purpose. Further, even upon the court's reasoning, would it not be possible to believe that the board of directors, whose task it was to supervise Skilling, sub silentio directed and approved his actions?
As the above analysis shows, there is little morally wrongful in Skilling's conduct.
207
There was no suggestion that Skilling had anything to gain at the expense of Enron by his alleged crimes. In fact, all the evidence pointed to Skilling working for the success of To sum up, Skilling's conduct was at worst an aggressive interpretation of existing law.
The government did not adduce any evidence that he intentionally committed acts that he knew to be wrong. It is arguable that overly optimistic and egregiously risky actions fraudulent conduct. Further, it is a sufficient detriment for an employee, contrary to his duty of honesty, to withhold material information, i.e., information that he had reason to believe would lead a reasonable employer to change its conduct. Accordingly, the jury was entitled to convict Skilling of conspiracy to commit honest-services wire fraud on these elements. 
